










































Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups
Citation for published version:
Sharma, J & Nightingale, A 2014, 'Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups: experiences in
Nepal' Disasters, vol 38, no. 3, pp. 517–539. DOI: 10.1111/disa.12056
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/disa.12056
Link:






© Sharma, J., & Nightingale, A. (2013). Community Forestry User-Groups and Conflict: Experiences of a Donor
Supported Community Forestry Programme in Nepal. Disasters.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups: experiences 
in Nepal  
 
Andrea Nightingale Associate Professor, School of Global Studies, University of 
Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, and Honorary Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, 
University of Edinburgh, and Jeevan Raj Sharma Lecturer, School of Social and 








































































1 LFP was keen to explore why CFUGs were so resilient during the conflict in Nepal, something for which 
all the forestry donors and independent researchers already had anecdotal evidence. This study was 
commissioned by them, engaging independent researchers who worked with their field level staff to collect 
the data. As a result, the research was contained to LFP areas only. We have also triangulated the data here 
























In	 the	 following	 sections,	we	 first	 give	 a	 short	 sketch	 of	 the	 insurgency	 period	 in	




structure	 of	 the	 groups	 contributed	 to	 resilience.	 This	 is	 important	 for	 project	
planners	 and	 managers	 globally	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 overall	 structure	 of	 a	
development	intervention	like	community	forestry	can	help	ensure	the	programme	
will	be	able	to	continue	operating	in	the	face	of	violent	conflict.	The	second	section	
details	 the	 strategies	 and	 tactics	 used	 by	 CFUG	 members	 to	 ensure	 they	 could	
																																																								
2	 The	 categories	 of	 low,	 medium	 and	 high	 sensitivity	 were	 developed	 for	 Safe	 and	 Effective	
Development	 in	 Conflict	 (SEDC)	 protocols	 and	 reflect	 the	 perspective	 of	 donors	 and	 service	
providers.	While	this	was	the	original	intention	of	the	categories,	another	logic	might	be	appropriate	
to	understand	how	CFUGs	were	affected	and	the	best	way	to	support	them	in	the	future.	Our	study	
clearly	 revealed	 that	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 CFUGs,	 the	 most	 sensitive	 groups	 in	 terms	 of	
resilience	were	 those	 that	were	caught	between	 the	Maoists	and	 the	Army	(‘sensitive’	under	SEDC	
categorisation).	They	faced	the	biggest	challenges	in	terms	of	operating	and	in	many	cases,	displayed	
the	 most	 creativity	 in	 devising	 coping	 strategies.	 In	 this	 sense,	 we	 understand	 them	 to	 be	 ‘most	






continue	 functioning.	 This	 contributes	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 how	 the	 conflict	
unfolded	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Nepal	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 everyday	 livelihood	




























































We	 define	 resilience	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 CFUGs	 to	 respond	 to	 conflict	 conditions,	
negotiate	 difficulties	 and	 return	 to	 regular	 functioning	 after	 a	 period	 of	 pressure.	
More	specifically,	we	explore	whether	groups	retained	a	sense	of	identity,	sufficient	
infrastructure	and	shared	purpose	 to	be	able	 to	 resume	 ‘regular’	 functioning	after	






to	 claim	 the	moral	 high	 ground	 and	 use	 that	 as	 a	 strong	 platform	 from	which	 to	
negotiate	operating	space.		
Second,	 community	 forestry	 is	 seen	 as	 community	 owned,	 neutral,	 equitable	 and	
pro‐poor;	thus	benefiting	all	members	and	not	a	part	of	the	state.	Importantly,	while	
CFUGs	 have	 support	 from	 both	 donors	 and	 the	 state,	 community	 forestry	 is	 not	
believed	 to	 be	 imposed	 by	 outsiders.	 CFUGs	 gave	 villagers	 an	 identity	 that	 was	
neutral	and	distinct	 from	the	other	more	politically	problematic	 identities	 in	rural	
areas	 such	 as	 caste,	 ethnicity,	 class	 or	 political	 party	 membership	 (Nightingale,	
2011).	 This	 neutral	 identity	 helped	 to	 protect	 the	 group	 and	 its	 members	 in	
particular	contexts.	
Third,	community	 forestry	user‐groups	both	own	and	 control	 significant	 financial	
and	physical	(forestry)	resources.	These	resources	were	needed	by	the	Nepal	Army	
	 6
and	 the	 Maoists	 and	 to	 ensure	 they	 had	 access	 to	 them,	 both	 parties	 needed	 to	
negotiate	with	the	CFUGs.	Here	the	distinction	made	by	political	ecologists	between	
control	over	and	access	to	resources	is	crucial.	Control	over	resources	indicates	legal	
rights	 and	 control	 over	 decision	 making	 in	 everyday	 practice,	 whereas	 access	
indicates	 the	 ability	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 and	 use	 forest	 resources	 (Ribot	 and	Peluso,	
2003,	Peet	and	Watts,	2004).	Our	study	found	in	some	areas	CFUGs	lost	control	over	
their	 accounts	 or	 their	 forest	 resources	or	 both,	 but	were	 able	 to	 retain	 access	 to	
them.		
Four,	 all	 the	 groups	 interviewed	 expressed	 a	 strong	 determination	 to	 continue	
actively	 operating.	 This	 commitment	 to	 the	 CFUG	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 creative	
strategies	to	cope	with	pressure	from	the	conflicting	parties.	It	also	led	to	strategies	
to	 retain	 access	 to	 resources	 even	when	 groups	 relinquished	 various	 elements	 of	
their	 control	 over	 them.	While	 in	 some	 respects	 these	 groups	 seem	 to	 have	 lost	
control	 over	 their	 forest,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 their	
creative	 strategies	 contributed	 to	 the	 long	 term	 resilience	 of	 the	 group	 by	
maintaining	access.		
In	order	to	illustrate	and	support	these	conclusions,	we	now	turn	to	the	structural	
features	 of	 community	 forestry	 as	 a	 programme	 and	 CFUGs	 as	 institutions	 that	






themselves.	 The	 most	 important	 finding	 from	 this	 study	 is	 that	 CFUG	 members	
displayed	 remarkable	 creativity	 and	 commitment	 to	 operating	 and	 it	 was	 only	
through	 their	 daily	 practices	 and	 use	 of	 these	 institutional	 features	 that	 the	
structure	 itself	 was	 meaningful	 in	 promoting	 resilience	 (explored	 in	 the	 second	
section	below).	However,	we	also	 found	 that	groups	who	were	very	weak	 in	 their	
structure—particularly	in	proper	accounting	procedures—lost	resilience	faster	than	
those	 who	 were	 sound.	 We	 explore	 this	 more	 fully	 below	 under	 points	 of	
vulnerability	 (third	 section).	 On	 a	 positive	 note,	 many	 groups	 appear	 to	 have	
become	stronger	as	a	consequence	of	pressure	from	the	conflict.		
Sense	of	Ownership	








CFUGs	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 ‘local’	 groups	 and	 not	 part	 of	 the	 state	 or	 a	 donor	
programme.	
During	 the	conflict	 the	user	groups	 thus	asserted	 that	 they	were	 local	groups	 that	
had	emerged	from	the	grassroots,	and	that	they	worked	for	the	needs	of	everyone	in	



















In	 the	 narrative,	 the	 group	 members	 said	 the	 Maoists	 wanted	 to	 blow	 up	 the	
building,	 but	 user‐group	 members—who	 were	 also	 Maoists—convinced	 the	
commanders	 to	 leave	 their	 building	 alone.	 Overall,	 the	 structure	 of	 community	
forestry	that	gives	CFUGs	autonomy	and	control	over	resources,	also	allowed	user‐




Closely	 related	 to	 the	above	point,	 the	community	 forestry	programme	 is	 founded	
on	principles	of	inclusion.	LFP	as	a	project	has	worked	to	ensure	representation	and	
to	 encourage	 participation	 on	 the	 part	 of	marginalised	 community	members.	 The	
structural	commitment	to	 ‘pro‐poor’	policies	including	access	to	resources	and	the	
use	of	CFUG	funds	for	pro‐poor	projects,	was	vital	to	the	claims	made	by	CFUGs	that	
their	 goals	were	 compatible	with	 those	 of	 the	Maoists.	 Thus,	 the	 core	 researcher	











support	rural	development	 in	remote	areas.	These	activities	are	a	 core	part	of	 the	
state’s	development	agenda	and	for	the	Army	to	actively	work	against	it	would	have	
been	 disastrous.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 CFUGs	 had	 the	moral	 high	 ground.	 In	 some	
places	 the	 Army	 did	 make	 the	 operation	 of	 CFUGs	 very	 difficult	 and	 members	







local	 organisation,	 politically	 neutral	 and	working	 for	 the	 needs	 of	 all	 community	
members.	 Such	 skills	 appear	 to	 be	 ‘learned’	 through	 community	 forestry.	
Structurally,	CFUGs	encourage	public	participation	by	members	and	require	group	
leaders	to	cultivate	consensus	in	the	group.	CFUGs	also	have	to	negotiate	with	other	
nearby	 groups	 or	 District	 Forest	 Officers,	 all	 of	 which	 gives	 them	 significant	
experience	 in	 negotiation	 and	 consensus	 building	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 different	
stakeholders,	 even	 if	 some	real	exclusions	continue	to	plague	 the	programme	as	a	






are	 for	 us,	 for	 our	 own	 benefits	 we	 didn’t	 need	 to	 be	 afraid	 from	 external	
threats….	We	became	strong	on	our	decisions	and	implementation	[of	the	fees].	
The	decisions	were	also	 favourable	 for	Maoist	 families,	 their	 family	members	
were	also	supportive	on	the	decisions.	(Western	region,	Maoist	controlled	area)		
Inclusive	practices	that	underpin	LFP’s	approach	to	community	forestry	have	clearly	
been	 internalized	 by	 CFUGs	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 the	 group	 developed	 and	
maintained	integrity	and	resilience.	
The	LFP	and	other	donor	programmes	have	been	concerned	about	the	tendency	for	
elites	 to	dominate	CFUGs	and	have	sought	 to	counter	balance	 that	by	encouraging	
groups	 to	 give	 leadership	 positions	 and	 a	 voice	 to	 women,	 the	 poor	 and	 other	
disadvantaged	 people	 within	 groups.	 During	 the	 conflict,	 however,	 we	 have	
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evidence	 that	 this	 so‐called	 ‘elite	 capture’	 often	worked	 to	 their	 advantage.	 Elites	
CFUGs	 members	 often	 had	 social	 capital	 and	 networks	 within	 the	 Army	 or	 the	
Maoist	commanders	(or	both)	and	were	able	to	utilise	these	skills	and	networks	to	
facilitate	their	negotiations.	For	example,	
The	 chairperson	 was	 very	 good	 in	 negotiating	 with	 police,	 army	 and	 the	
Maoists.	When	approached	by	the	Maoists	he	would	show	them	our	records	to	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 committee	 were	 transparent.	 (Mid‐
western	region,	disputed	area)		
Here	we	want	to	emphasize	that	the	negotiating	skills	and	networks	of	CFUG	leaders	
in	 many	 places	 developed	 from	 community	 forestry	 (Kharel,	 1993).	 There	 is	
therefore	a	mixed	pattern	of	CFUGs	being	dominated	by	people	who	already	have	
significant	 social	 power,	 as	 well	 as	 community	 forestry	 being	 a	 context	 wherein	
people	gain	social	power	by	virtue	of	managing	the	groups.	
Based	on	this	evidence,	we	conclude	that	three	main	structural	elements	gave	user	
groups	 bargaining	 power	 and	 thus	 resilience.	 First,	 community	 forestry	 has	
developed	group	members’	abilities	to	negotiate	with	elites;	much	of	this	confidence	
to	 speak	 out	 has	 been	 learned	 from	 the	 functioning	 of	 their	 groups,	which	 has	 in	
part	 been	 promoted	 by	 donors,	 and	 in	 part	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
programme.	 Second,	 the	 proper	 implementation	 of	 community	 forestry,	 including	
open	 and	 clear	 decision‐making,	 transparent	 accounts	 and	 group	 consensus	
building,	were	vital	for	their	ability	to	project	a	positive	outward	image.	Third,	the	
social	 networks	 of	 many	 user	 group	 office	 holders	 with	 key	 members	 of	 the	
conflicting	parities	gave	them	access	to	commanders	on	both	sides.		
Financial	Transparency		
Another	 key	 structural	 aspect	 was	 user	 groups’	 generally	 open	 and	 transparent	
financial	 systems.	 All	 groups	 have	 to	 present	 their	 annual	 accounts	 with	 a	 clear	
record	 of	 the	 transactions	 to	 their	 annual	 general	 assemblies	 wherein	 every	
household	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 at	 least	 one	 representative.	 The	 importance	 of	







their	 claims	 that	 they	 were	 engaged	 in	 pro‐poor	 activities	 and	 were	 using	 their	
revenues	for	appropriate	local	development	activities.	In	many	places	this	appeased	
the	Maoists,	 although	most	user	 groups	 still	 had	 to	 give	 forced	donations.	Groups	
from	all	 the	different	regions	gave	examples	of	contesting	 these	donations	(locally	
known	as	 ‘taxes’).	For	example,	user	groups	 in	the	east	of	 the	country	managed	to	
negotiate	 a	 lower	 rate	 of	 forced	 donation	 by	 negotiating	 collectively	 through	
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FECOFUN3.	 In	 2005,	 the	 Maoists	 had	 demanded	 30%	 of	 user	 group	 funds.	
Individually	 the	 groups	 had	 been	 unable	 to	 resist	 these	 demands,	 whilst	 taking	
collective	 action	 had	 put	 them	 in	 a	 stronger	 position	 and	 enabled	 them	 to	
successfully	negotiate.	
	
The	 written	 nature	 of	 operational	 plans	 and	 constitutions,	 lists	 of	 members	 and	
records	of	decisions,	activities	and	 finances	meant	they	could	be	shown	to	anyone	
who	questioned	their	credibility.	There	are	other	power	issues	associated	with	the	
emphasis	 on	written	 records	within	 community	 forestry	 (Nightingale,	 2005,	Ojha,	




Another	 important	 structural	 feature	 of	 user	 groups	 is	 that	 major	 decisions	 are	

















vital	 and	 in	 the	 below	 section	 on	 tactical	 strategies,	 evidence	 of	 the	 various	ways	
that	CFUGs	helped	to	promote	group	cohesion	is	clear.	The	structural	commitment	
in	 community	 forestry	 to	 issues	 of	 transparency	 and	 inclusive	 participation	 thus	
contributed	to	resilience.	Development	programmes	that	seek	to	promote	inclusion	
and	transparency,	therefore,	are	more	likely	to	be	able	to	operate	in	conflict.	Indeed,	
in	Nepal	such	principles	were	 institutionalised	as	 ‘good	practice’	 through	Safe	and	
Effective	Development	in	Conflict	guidelines.	
																																																								
3 FECOFUN is a national federation of community forestry user groups. It acts as a civil society association 











b)	 the	 basic	 operating	 guidelines	 (BOGs)	 of	 Nepal’s	 development	 partners	
that	 set	 out	 the	 standards	 expected	 of	 their	 projects	 and	 staff	 (including	





to	 the	 Maoists,	 engaging	 in	 egregious	 corruption	 beyond	 this	 payment	 was	
considered	hazardous	 for	 individuals.	There	 is	evidence	that	LFP’s	commitment	 to	








































From	 this	 account	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 community	 forestry	 helped	
support	 CFUGs	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 but	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 say	 which	 structural	
aspects	 were	 more	 important	 than	 others.	 In	 part	 this	 is	 because	 of	 the	 uneven	
nature	of	 the	conflict	across	 the	study	sites—the	groups	were	not	 facing	the	same	
pressures—but	 also	 because	 in	 many	 cases	 it	 appears	 that	 structural	 elements	
combined	 conferred	 resilience.	 Financial	 transparency	 was	 not	 sufficient	 without	
good	 leadership	 and	 consensus	 in	 the	 group,	 for	 example;	 and	 the	 political	
neutrality	of	DFID	as	well	as	the	decentralised	nature	of	their	programme	delivery	










In	 this	 section,	 we	 detail	 the	 creative,	 tactical	 strategies	 groups	 used	 to	 continue	
operating.	Not	all	groups	used	all	 these	strategies	and	many	groups	changed	 their	
strategies	 as	 the	 conflict	 progressed.	 But	 rather	 than	 looking	 for	 empirical	
consistency,	 we	 believe	 this	 illustrates	 more	 general	 conceptual	 points.	 To	 have	
resilience,	 groups	 need	 to	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 learn	 and	 respond	 in	 a	 flexible	
manner	to	conditions	that	are	changing	and	unpredictable.	It	also	helps	to	add	depth	
																																																								
4 The UK deliberately took a neutral political stance in Nepal, unlike the USA (via George Bush) which 







affiliations	of	 their	members	 to	 claim	 their	neutrality.	 For	 example,	 one	Mid‐West	
user	group	told	how,	if	they	needed	to	travel	to	the	district	centre,	they	brought	with	





affiliated	 members	 can	 be	 simply	 ‘CFUG	 members’	 when	 in	 the	 context	 of	 CFUG	
business.	We	want	to	be	clear	that	we	do	not	believe	that	CFUGs	were	‘harbouring’	
Maoists,	 rather,	 people	 in	 rural	 localities	 have	multiple	 identities	 and	 at	 different	
moments	 in	 time	 and	 in	 different	 spaces	 they	 move	 between	 these	 identities	
(Nightingale,	2011).	When	doing	CFUG	business,	the	people	in	question	were	‘CFUG	
members’	 and	 nothing	 else	 at	 that	 particular	moment.	 The	 groups	 also	 sought	 to	
demonstrate	that	they	were	socially	inclusive.	As	explained	above,	most	CFUGs	and	
the	 donors	 supporting	 them	 have	 socially	 inclusive	 policies	 that	 target	 women,	
Dalits	and	 the	members	of	other	 traditionally	marginalised	groups	 to	ensure	 their	
participation	 (Nightingale,	 2002,	Khadka,	 2010,	Gilmour	 and	Fisher,	 1991,	 Kharel,	
1993,	 Hobley,	 1996,	 Ojha	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Given	 the	 Maoists	 agenda	 to	 overturn	
entrenched	hierarchies	in	Nepalese	society,	the	inclusiveness	of	CFUGs	fit	well	with	
their	agenda.	 It	was	almost	 impossible	 for	 local	Maoist	commanders	 to	shut	down	






instances	 this	was	 successful,	 even	 if	 the	user	 groups	 lost	 some	degree	of	 control	
over	 their	 resources.	 Yet	 by	 giving	 up	 some	 control,	 we	 argue	 that	 our	 findings	
suggest	the	groups’	main	concern	was	to	maintain	access	to	their	forests	and	their	
funds,	 and	 where	 possible,	 to	 retain	 operating	 autonomy.	 Such	 strategies	 have	
strong	 antecedents	 in	 the	 cultural	 commitment	 to	 ‘compromise’	 (kurra	miloune)	
that	runs	across	Nepalese	society.		
	
In	 almost	 all	 the	 study	 areas,	 the	 user	 groups	 engaged	 in	 dialogue	with	 both	 the	
Maoists	 and	 the	Nepal	 Army,	with	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 had	 contact	with	 one	














In	 the	 Terai	 a	 number	 of	 strategies	 emerged	 in	 one	 group	 including:	 holding	
meetings	 and	 dialogue	 with	 both	 sides	 to	 keep	 them	 informed	 about	 user	 group	
activities;	 placing	 Maoist	 members	 on	 committees	 and	 in	 special	 interest	 sub‐
groups;	 and	allowing	 the	Maoists	 to	 collect	 fuelwood	 free	of	 cost	 in	 the	beginning	
and	at	50%	of	the	standard	rate	later.Thus,	this	group	made	concessions	on	control	
by	placing	Maoists	on	its	committee,	but	as	 the	conflict	progressed,	 the	users	took	
some	 control	 back	 by	 charging	 for	 fuelwood;compromises	 which	 helped	 retain	
access	to	their	resources.	
What	 is	 of	 interest	 here	 is	 that	 groups	 tried,	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 success,	 to	
negotiate	and	compromise	with	both	conflict	parties.	In	the	above	quotes,	it	is	also	
crucial	 to	 note	 that	 the	 link	 between	 CFUG	 Maoist	 members	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
group	was	vital	for	convincing	the	Maoists	that	the	group	should	retain	control	over	
their	 management	 decisions.	 Such	 personal	 connections	 are	 the	 way	 business	 is	
usually	achieved	 in	Nepal.	Having	 ‘your	own	person’	 (afno	manche)	 in	an	office	or	







































when	 or	where	 local	 residents	 assembled,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	many	 groups	modified	
their	functioning	to	ensure	continued	access	to	their	resources.	The	most	common	









More	 often,	 executive	 committees	 became	 more	 central,	 as	 the	 holding	 of	 large	
meetings	was	disapproved	of	by	 the	Nepal	Army.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	most	 common	













to	debate	 their	 affairs.	 These	kinds	of	 strategies	 give	 insight	 into	how	 the	 conflict	
affected	people’s	everyday	lives	in	rural	Nepal.	The	ability	to	gather,	plan	and	hold	
assemblies	of	any	kind	became	difficult	if	not	dangerous	in	most	places.	In	some	of	
the	Maoist	 controlled	 areas,	 such	 assemblies	were	welcomed,	 provided	 they	were	









in	 the	 forest	 during	 a	 confrontation.	 However,	 as	 forest	 products	were	 (and	 are)	





areas,	namely	by	 issuing	 identity	cards.	This	use	of	 identity	cards	 to	prove	people	
were	 group	 members	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 widespread.	 The	 kind	 of	 cards	 issued	
varied;	 but	most	 often,	 it	was	 a	 system	negotiated	with	 the	 local	Maoist	 or,	more	
often,	Nepal	Army	commanders.	One	of	the	user	groups	in	a	Nepal	Army	controlled	
















in	 order	 to	 alleviate	 the	 short	 term	 pressures	 of	 living	 under	 conflict.	 Yet,	 by	




One	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	most	 frequently	 by	 respondents	was	 the	 control	 of	 user	
group	 funds.	 The	 Maoists	 imposed	 forced	 donations	 on	 any	 person	 or	 group	
perceived	 to	 have	 funds	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 their	 ‘People’s	 War’.	 Nearly	 all	 the	














their	 cash	 reserves	 quickly	 on	 projects	 that	 would	 be	 deemed	 ‘pro‐poor’	 or	































their	 ability	 to	 operate	 during	 the	 conflict.	 Through	 all	 these	 examples,	 the	
confidence	group	members	gained	through	community	forestry	in	promoting	their	
own	needs	and	agendas	even	to	actors	more	powerful	(and	violent)	than	themselves	









of	 the	disadvantaged	members	worked	against	 their	own	groups	because	 they	 felt	




have	 lost	more	control	of	decision	making	than	 in	places	where	 they	were	able	 to	
retain	more	control	over	the	committee.	Experience	from	a	Maoist	controlled	area	in	
Terai	 showed	 that	 although	 all	 the	 political	 parties	were	 represented	 in	 the	 user	












resulting	 from	 the	 politicisation	 of	 group	 activities	 caused	many	 problems	due	 to	
the	continuous	debates	between	a	 faction	opting	 for	 the	new	order	offered	by	 the	
Maoists,	and	the	other	faction	that	opted	for	the	old	order.	In	the	Terai,	one	group	
claimed	that	nearby	user	groups	had	been	unable	to	operate	‘due	to	corruption’.	The	
conflict	 seems	 to	 have	 thrown	 into	 relief	 any	 problems	 with	 corruption	 or	
domination	 of	 decision	 making	 by	 elite	 members.	 Finally,	 some	 groups	 were	 not	




most	 resilience.	Many	of	 the	groups	 that	 lost	 control	over	 their	 forests	during	 the	




groups	 rules	 such	 as	 prohibitions	 on	 open	 grazing.	 These	 findings	 point	 to	 some	
important	areas	for	further	research.	The	funds	and	forest	resources	of	CFUGs	was	
not	only	desired	by	the	conflicting	parties,	but	was	also	an	important	focal	point	for	
the	groups.	 If	 access	 to	 the	 forest	 and	 their	 cash	 funds	was	 curtailed	 significantly,	
the	group	itself	lost	focus	and	an	identity.	As	donors	seek	to	support	development	in	
the	 face	 of	 conflict,	 attention	 to	 the	 structures	 and	 practices	 that	 will	 help	 local	




This	 study	 explored	 the	 factors	 that	 contributed	 to	 CFUGs	 resilience	 during	 the	
conflict	in	Nepal.	The	reasons	were	not	the	same	for	each	group,	but	there	are	some	
common	patterns.	The	design	of	community	forestry	as	a	national	programme	and	
the	 institutional	 structure	 supported	 by	 LFP	 specifically	 were	 clearly	 central	 for	
helping	 to	 generate	 an	 image	 of	 neutrality	 as	well	 as	 pro‐poor,	 inclusive	 and	 just	
processes	 of	 forest	management.	 The	 decentralised	 nature	 of	 community	 forestry	
and	 its	 emphasis	 on	 public,	 transparent	 systems	 of	 governance,	 is	 the	 most	
important	aspect	of	structure.	This	image	was	fundamental	for	groups	to	be	able	to	
claim	 the	 right	 to	 operate	 and	 in	many	 instances,	 to	 claim	 a	 ‘moral	 high	 ground’	
when	negotiating	with	the	conflict	parties.	The	Maoists	and	the	Army	found	it	very	




had	well	 developed	 negotiating	 skills	 that	 they	 used	 confidently	with	 the	 conflict	
parties.		










and	 to	 engage	 in	 dialogue	 with	 the	 conflict	 parties	 if	 their	 control	 and	 access	 to	
resources	was	threatened.	In	particular,	they	sought	to	maintain	access	to	both	their	
cash	 funds	and	 their	 forestry	 resources,	even	 if	 to	do	so	required	 them	to	give	up	
some	control	over	them.	As	the	conflict	progressed,	it	seems	that	all	parties	changed	
their	 tactics	 somewhat.	 The	 Army	 and	Maoists	 realised	 that	 they	 could	 not	 deny	




least	 in	part	 attribute	 to	 the	other	 two	key	 reasons	we	have	 identified:	 the	 sound	
structure	 of	 community	 forestry	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 retain	 their	 resources.	 CFUGs	
employed	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 creative	 strategies	 to	maintain	 access	 to	 and	 control	
over	 their	resources	and	CFUG	committees,	 including:	 identity	cards,	 changing	 the	
context	 or	 the	 timing	 of	 their	meetings,	 negotiating	with	 the	 conflict	 parties,	 and	
relinquishing	some	control	over	their	processes	in	order	to	keep	the	group	and	its	
resources	intact.	This	latter	point	is	the	most	contentious	and	points	to	some	of	the	
vulnerabilities	 of	 CFUGs.	 Where	 the	 compromises	 to	 keep	 functioning	 were	 too	
great,	 groups	 lost	 resilience	and	many	of	 these	groups	 continue	 to	 struggle	 in	 the	







when	 their	 use	 of	 funds	 was	 not	 transparent.	 In	 such	 cases,	 their	 own	members	
worked	were	complicit	 in	undermining	their	resilience	due	to	a	sense	of	exclusion	
from	both	decision	making	 and	 resources.	 Groups	were	 also	 vulnerable	when	 the	
compromises	 they	 were	 forced	 to	 make	 were	 too	 great,	 particularly	 if	 they	
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relinquished	 large	 amounts	 of	 cash.	 All	 groups	 were	 accustomed	 to	 giving	 some	
informal	taxes	to	government	officials,	so	they	did	not	object	in	principle	to	giving	a	
tax	 to	 the	 Maoists,	 rather	 they	 objected	 if	 they	 believed	 the	 amounts	 demanded	
were	 too	 high.	 Most	 of	 the	 CFUGs	 interviewed	 successfully	 negotiated	 lower	
‘donations’,	 but	 those	 groups	 who	 were	 forced	 to	 give	 large	 amounts	 found	
themselves	foundering.	











the	 conflicting	 parties	 and	 CFUGs	 learned	 throughout	 the	 insurgency	 period	 and	
most	CFUGs	were	able	to	negotiate	operating	space	for	themselves	on	the	basis	that	
their	activities	were	for	the	benefit	of	all,	and	necessarily	for	their	survival.	
These	 stories	 have	 helped	 to	 explain	 why	 (and	 how)	 CFUGs	 remained	 resilient	
during	 the	 conflict.	 Such	 lessons	 are	 crucial	 for	 development	 planners	 as	 they	
attempt	 to	 promote	 natural	 resource	 management	 regimes	 that	 can	 weather	 the	
challenges	 posed	 by	 climate	 change	 and	 violent	 conflict.	 The	 stories	 also	 give	 us	
another	look	into	the	everyday	experience	of	conflict	in	Nepal	and	show	how	people	
used	 institutions,	creativity	and	skills	 they	 learned	through	community	 forestry	 to	
create	 space	 for	 livelihood	 activities	 and	 maintain	 a	 commitment	 to	 long	 term	
forestry	management.	Not	 all	 groups	were	 successful,	 of	 course,	 but	 nevertheless,	
the	experience	from	Nepal	helps	to	show	the	agency	and	power	of	rural	residents	in	
the	 face	 of	 conflict	 as	 a	 counter	 weight	 to	 narratives	 that	 frame	 them	 simply	 as	
victims	or	perpetrators	of	violence.	
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